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Abstract
Need-to-know is a fundamental security concept: a party
should not learn information that is irrelevant to its mis-
sion. In this paper we show that during a trust negotia-
tion in which parties show their credentials to one another,
an adversary Alice can systematically harvest information
about all of a victim Bob’s credentials that Alice is entitled
to see, regardless of their relevance to a negotiation. We
prove that it is not possible to enforce need-to-know condi-
tions with the trust negotiation model and protocol devel-
oped by Yu, Winslett, and Seamons. We also present exam-
ples of similar need-to-know attacks with the trust negotia-
tion approaches proposed by Bonatti and Samarati, and by
Winsborough and Li. Finally, we propose possible counter-
measures against need-to-know attacks, and discuss their
advantages and disadvantages.
1 Introduction
Trust negotiation is an authorization approach intended
for use in open systems, i.e., systems where users’ iden-
tities and access privileges may not be known in advance
[2, 3, 4, 6, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22]. With trust negotiation,
each resource has an associated authorization policy that
describes the properties of the users and software entities
(“clients”) that are allowed to access it. At run time, a
client can learn about the policy protecting the resource it
wishes to access, and present verifiable, unforgeable digital
credentials to prove that it possesses the properties required
by the policy. In this section, we use an extended exam-
ple to present the basic concepts behind trust negotiation.
Then we show how to launch a need-to-know attack against
this example, illustrating how an attacker can extract infor-
mation about any credential that a negotiating party might
own.
1.1 Automated Trust Negotiation
Often credentials contain sensitive information, in which
case we view them as sensitive resources that must also be
protected by policies. For example, consider a client Bob
who wants to obtain a driver’s license (DL) from the Illi-
nois Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). To obtain his
license, Bob must present either his passport with photo or
a current driver’s license with photo. In addition, he must
present proof of Illinois residency, e.g., via an Illinois ad-
dress on his current driver’s license or else a power bill with
a local address. Translating the DMV’s policies to work
with digital credentials, we have three policies:
policy for new DL = strong ID ∧ IL resident
strong ID = passport ∨ DL
IL resident = IL DL ∨ IL utility bill
Before carrying on with the example, we digress for a mo-
ment to present a few technical details. We define the body
of each policy by a monotonic Boolean propositional logic
formula (meaning, all symbols evaluate to either true or
false, and no negations appear), preceded by a propositional
symbol (the policy name) and an equals sign. The proposi-
tional symbols are typed, i.e., each symbol either denotes
a policy or a credential. Each policy name can appear on
the left hand side of at most one policy definition. To avoid
confusion in our examples, we assume that the sets of cre-
dentials owned by Bob and the DMV are disjoint, as are
their policy names; thus credential names appearing in the
DMV’s policies refer to credentials that Bob may possess,
and vice versa. Further, we have named the subpolicies so
that they are reusable in other contexts. For example, a pol-
icy that defines who is allowed to take on a particular role
is likely to be widely referred to in an RBAC-based open
system.
The DMV’s knowledge base (KB) has four parts: its own
local policies and local credentials, and the policies and cre-
dentials it has received from others. A policy is satisfied if
its body evaluates to true under the truth assignment where
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DMVBob
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:
Bob requests New_DL service from DMV
DMV discloses its policy for the service
Bob discloses his policy for his credentials
DMV discloses its government agency registration
Bob discloses his credentials
DMV grants access to the service
Figure 1. A trust negotiation to renew a
driver’s license
all credentials in the local KB (i.e., all KB formulas consist-
ing of a single propositional symbol denoting a credential)
are assigned true and all others are assigned false. One can
imagine using a more powerful language, or encoding these
policies in datalog; the exact choice of encoding or language
is not important for our purposes.
When Bob walks into the DMV to renew his license, he
is not likely to open his wallet and show the DMV employ-
ees every credential that he possesses. Instead, he will study
the policies and selectively choose the credentials that he
presents to the DMV. He would consider the DMV to be
unauthorized to view certain sensitive credentials, such as
his credit cards. Other credentials such as his library card
might be less sensitive, but still the DMV has no demon-
strated “need to know” about them—they are irrelevant for
the matter at hand. Further, he is not likely to show both his
passport and his driver’s license, as this is not a minimal set
of credentials that satisfies the DL policy. Instead, he would
prefer to show just his current license, which satisfies both
the IL address and strong ID policies.
Now consider how to automate this process, so that
Bob (actually a small agent acting on his behalf) automat-
ically carries out a trust negotiation with (the agent for)
the DMV (see Figure 1). If Bob satisfies the DMV’s pol-
icy for new DL, the DMV should immediately send him a
token to access its on-line renewal service. We model this
as the DMV having a new DL credential in its KB, which it
will show to Bob (send to his KB) once policy for new DL
is satisfied. We adopt the convention that the policy protect-
ing object O will be named policy for O.
Bob should start the negotiation by explaining what he
wants, namely, new DL. The DMV cannot send new DL
to Bob yet, because new DL’s protective policy pol-
icy for new DL is not satisfied. Instead, it responds by dis-
closing the definition of policy for new DL. However, that
definition is insufficient for Bob’s purposes. Either Bob
must now request the definition of one or both subpolicies,
or better yet, the DMV can volunteer that information when
it discloses policy for new DL.
Once Bob has seen policy for new DL and at least one
subpolicy definition, he can take action. If he does not have
either of the credentials mentioned in a subpolicy, he will
want to end the negotiation. If he does have those creden-
tials, they are likely to be protected by access policies them-
selves. For example, perhaps he is willing to show his Illi-
nois license and passport to anyone in the government. In
this case his knowledge base (KB) contains the following:
policy for IL DL = government
policy for passport = government
passport, IL DL, library card, patient ID
The last line of propositions indicates that Bob possesses
digital credentials representing a local license, a passport,
and other credentials; he does not have a power bill in his
own name. In addition, Bob’s KB contains the policy defi-
nitions that the DMV just sent him.
An omniscient entity can see that Bob can satisfy pol-
icy for new DL. Some approaches to trust negotiation al-
low the negotiation to proceed without either party actually
showing the other its policies and/or credentials, through
various clever tricks [8, 12, 15, 17]. Such approaches are ap-
propriate when privacy and leak prevention are paramount
considerations; otherwise they are rather too expensive at
run time. In this paper we will consider scenarios where
Bob and the DMV are willing to divulge their credentials
and policies to one another (provided the appropriate access
policy is satisfied). For example, Bob may send the DMV
his IL DL in the form of an X.509 credential, with a proof
that he owns it. We will not model the details of credential
formatting or proof of ownership in this paper, as they do
not affect the problems that concern us.
In real life, Bob would know that he was standing in a
government office; online, it is often not so obvious who
one is talking to. Bob can continue the negotiation by send-
ing the DMV his policy for his Illinois license (assuming
he would rather not disclose his passport). Assume that the
DMV does have a government credential and is willing to
show it to anyone. Then the DMV can show Bob its govern-
ment credential and prove that it owns it, which we model
as having that credential appear in Bob’s KB. Now Bob’s
Illinois license policy is satisfied, and he can show his li-
cense to the DMV, which we model as having the IL DL
proposition appear in the DMV’s KB.
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1.2 Sensitive Policies
In this particular example, neither Bob nor the DMV has
any sensitive policies, i.e., policies that must themselves
be protected by policies. We can represent this by adding
the formula policy for P = true to the KB, for each policy
P its owner possesses. Often corporate policies are sen-
sitive, however, and personal policies can also give away
undesirable hints about the resources they protect. As a
real-world yet whimsical example, the Illinois DMV used
to secretly sell truck driver licenses to anyone willing to
pay $10,000. (This policy was uncovered after many of
the licensees had accidents.) We can represent this policy
by changing the definition of policy for new DL to include
a new disjunct, bribed. However, clearly this definition of
policy for new DL should never be shown to anyone. We
can enforce this by encoding the DMV’s KB as follows.
policy for new DL = (strong ID ∧ IL resident) ∨ other
other = bribed
policy for other = false
strong ID = passport ∨ DL
IL resident = IL DL ∨ IL utility bill
government, new DL
(For brevity, we will not list any KB formula of the form
policy for P = true.) During a negotiation, anyone can see
that there is an other clause in policy for new DL, but no
one can learn its definition, because the policy for disclosing
the definition is always false. Someone who has learned of-
fline about the bribery policy can push their bribe (modeled
here as a bribe credential) to the DMV, thereby satisfying
policy for new DL.
The presence of protected policies should not be con-
strued as an attempt to hide an unethical or illegal access
policy. Any organization can use the same technique to of-
fer special services to selected clients. For example, Sam’s
Club can e-mail an offer to all university employees, of-
fering them free membership if they show their university
ID card. Bob can click through the e-mail to automatically
store the associated policy in his KB. Or, a policy may leak
private information. For instance, suppose Bob had a re-
source blood test results that he will disclose to holders of
an AIDS researcher credential. Disclosing such a policy
freely would allow anyone to infer Bob’s medical condition
without actually possessing the proper credential. Bob may
wish to disclose such a policy only to holders of a doctor
credential, for example.
1.3 Motivation for Need-to-Know Attack
We are now ready to discuss the need-to-know attack on
trust negotiation. Suppose that the DMV wishes to collect
personal information on its clients and then sell the infor-
mation to marketers. The DMV can force Bob to disclose
credentials during negotiation that he would never disclose
in person. To automate this attack, the DMV first rewrites
its policies as follows:
original policy = (strong ID ∧ IL resident)
policy for new DL = original policy ∨attacklibrary
attacklibrary = (original policy1∧ library card) ∨attackutility
attackutility = (original policy2∧ IL utility bill) ∨attackpatient
attackpatient = (original policy3∧ patient ID)
original policy1 = original policy
original policy2 = original policy
original policy3 = original policy
strong ID = passport ∨ DL
IL resident = IL DL ∨ IL utility bill
While we have chosen policy names that are suggestive of
their content, of course the DMV would use opaque names
such as P753. The rewritten policies are logically equivalent
to the originals, and in fact, any client who could obtain a
renewal token under the old policies will be able to obtain a
token under the new policies.
When Bob asks for new DL, i.e., he requests access
to a token for online license renewal, the DMV sends
him policy for new DL = original policy ∨ attacklibrary
and attacklibrary = (original policy1∧ library card) ∨
attackutility.
When Bob examines these two formulas, his exact re-
action will depend on the trust negotiation protocol1 he is
using. In general, the only way he can keep the negotiation
moving forward is to send library card, or, if his trust nego-
tiation protocol allows it, query for the definition of some
of the undefined policies. Most trust negotiation protocols
would forbid him to send policy for library card = true, as
that response does not advance the state of the negotiation
and is due cause for the DMV to terminate the negotiation2.
Most protocols would also forbid him to send information
unrelated to the negotiation so far, such as his patient ID;
that behavior would also be due cause for termination.
Suppose that Bob sends his library card to the DMV.
With that tidbit in hand, the DMV moves on to ex-
tracting utility bill information from Bob. The DMV
1As defined in [22], a trust negotiation protocol defines the types of
messages that can be sent during a negotiation. Here we use the term in a
broader sense, to also indicate any limits on the contents of a message that
Bob can send. We formalize the concept later.
2One might argue that the DMV will learn something, so in some sense
the negotiation will advance. By that reasoning, however, Bob could mali-
ciously send an unending stream of irrelevant policy definitions to keep the
DMV busy, and that would also be considered to advance the negotiation.
To keep the negotiation focused, it is better to define “advancing the nego-
tiation” as adding new detail to a partially-formed proof of authorization.
We formalize this later.
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sends attackutility = (original policy2 ∧ IL utility bill) ∨
attackpatient. If his trust negotiation protocol allows it,
Bob can confess that he does not have a utility bill; in that
case, the DMV will move on to disclosing attackpatient ID
and gathering information about that aspect of his iden-
tity. Once that is complete, the DMV has finished gathering
marketable information and will disclose original policy =
(strong ID ∧ IL resident), strong ID = passport ∨ DL, and
IL resident = IL DL ∨ IL utility bill. The remainder of the
negotiation proceeds as normal.
If Bob’s trust negotiation protocol does not allow him to
declare that he does not have an Illinois utility bill, or if he
is sensitive about the fact that he does not possess one, he
should keep the formula policy for IL utility bill = false in
his KB. Then when asked for his utility bill, he can send
this policy definition in response. In this case, the DMV
will know that it can never learn whether Bob has an Illinois
utility bill, and move on to collecting the next piece of mar-
ketable information. This does not mean that the DMV’s
attack on need-to-know has failed. The attack is not in-
tended to breach confidentiality; it just makes a mockery of
the need-to-know principle by gathering as much irrelevant
information as it can legally have. As such, it does con-
stitute an honest-but-curious attack. The attacker does not
have to break the rules of the ATN framework, just rewrite
her policies and follow an allowed (if disingenuous) nego-
tiation strategy.
As mentioned above, if his protocol allows it, at any
point Bob can query for the definition of one of the unde-
fined policies mentioned by the DMV. For example, in the
first round of the negotiation, he could request the defini-
tions of original policy and/or attackutility. In this case, the
DMV should send the definitions if the policies protecting
them (true in this case) are satisfied. The DMV can prepare
for this possibility by modifying its policies for disclosing
original policy and attackutility as follows:
policy for original policy = true,
policy for policy for original policy = false
policy for attackutility = true,
policy for policy for attackutility = false
(And similarly for original policy1, original policy2, orig-
inal policy3, attackpatient, strong ID, and IL resident.)
These new formulas say that the definitions of orig-
inal policy and attackpatient can be disclosed to any-
one, but no one can learn that the formulas can be dis-
closed to anyone. Thus when Bob asks for the def-
inition of original policy, the DMV can send him pol-
icy for policy for original policy = false.3 Then if Bob
3There may be legitimate reasons for allowing policies to be false, but
even if we disallowed such policies, this tactic could still easily be used
wants to renew his driver’s license online, he has no choice
but to disclose the marketing-type information that the
DMV has requested. As discussed in more detail later, un-
der some circumstances a client could recognize that orig-
inal policy might be just true, but usually the client cannot
detect this type of attack.
We could prevent a need-to-know attack by requiring
each party to push the definition of every policy P it
mentions during the negotiation, whenever policy for P
is satisfied. If policy for P is not satisfied, it should
instead push the definition of policy for P , unless pol-
icy for policy for P is not satisfied; and so on. While sat-
isfactory in theory, this requirement is unappealing in prac-
tice. If 99% of clients gain access to a resource through
a particular combination of credentials, the resource owner
will be understandably reluctant to push every client the full
details of the other ways to gain access. 99% of the time,
sending those policies will just waste bandwidth and pro-
cessing power for both client and resource owner. Similarly,
one could require a resource owner to respond to a request
for the definition of policy P by immediately sending P , if
the policy P ′ that protects P is satisfied; else P ′, if the pol-
icy P ′′ that protects P ′ is satisfied; and so on. This suffers
from the same efficiency drawbacks.
The DMV’s attack will work against any client, not just
Bob. However, attackers will generally require more com-
plex encodings of their policies, for the following reason.
The need-to-know attack works by ensuring that the victim
has only one possible way to advance the state of the nego-
tiation, namely, by disclosing a piece of information that the
adversary wants. When the client’s and/or server’s policies
are significantly more complex than Bob’s and the DMV’s,
the server might lose this control while working to satisfy
a policy of the client’s (e.g., a policy for library card). We
present this more complex encoding in Section 3 and prove
that it succeeds against every client in Section 4.
Suppose now that Bob is the attacker and the DMV is
his unsuspecting target. Bob can encode the policy for his
Illinois license in the manner that we encoded the DMV’s
policies earlier. With the revised encoding, Bob can find out
whether the DMV owns any particular credential c, within
the limits of confidentiality. Bob and the DMV can also
both attack one another simultaneously, leading to a long
negotiation in which eventually one party is backed into a
corner and must start disclosing information about the re-
quested credentials. The negotiation will be finite, however,
as long as we ensure that client and server do not alter their
policies on the fly. This can be accomplished by sending a
commitment of their policy contents at the beginning of the
without a simple means of detection. For instance, the policy could require
some very rare credential, or even a unique credential which only belongs
to the policy writer (thus guaranteeing that no one else will ever be able to
satisfy the policy).
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negotiation.
We formalize the need-to-know attack in Sections 2 and
3, and prove its effectiveness within the protocol described
in [21] in Section 4. The reader who is willing to take those
aspects on faith may wish to skip directly to Section 5,
where we describe how to carry out need-to-know attacks
on other trust negotiation models. In Section 6, we discuss
possible remedies for the problem and conclude the paper.
2 Definitions
In this section, we give the necessary preliminaries for
the need-to-know attack. We start by defining the attack
formally, independently of the actual protocol being used.
We then present definitions for an example model and pro-
tocol for trust negotiation, following the lead of [21]. We
will use this model to demonstrate how to carry out the at-
tack against arbitrary clients in Section 3.
2.1 General Model for Attack
For uniformity, we will use the term resource to refer to
anything that can be protected by a policy, such as access to
an online service (e.g. new DL), another policy (e.g. pol-
icy for new DL), or a credential (e.g. IL utility bill).
In order to characterize this attack, we will examine the
credentials that the victim discloses to gain access to a ser-
vice. Some of these credentials may be disclosed unnec-
essarily (conceptually, the client could have gained access
without disclosing them). The following two definitions
formalize which credentials are necessary.
Definition 1. A minimal local satisfying set for resource R
is a set S of credentials and negations of credentials with
the following properties:
• S satisfies the policy for R, i.e., R’s policy evaluates
to true under the truth assignment that assigns true to
each credential in S, false to each credential whose
negation is in S, and false to all remaining credentials.
• No proper subset of S has this property.
Clearly no credential negations will appear in minimal
local satisfying sets. We include them here for technical
reasons.
Definition 2. A minimal (global) satisfying set for resource
R is a set S of credentials and negations of credentials con-
structed recursively as follows:
• S contains a minimal local satisfying set for R.
• If S contains a resource protected by policy P , then S
also contains a minimal local satisfying set for P .
There are many different approaches to trust negotiation.
As a generalization, though, all of them require each side to
exchange credentials and policies. The following definition
formalizes this.
Definition 3. A disclosure (message) sent from one party to
another during negotiation is a set of local credentials, lo-
cal policies, and any other message elements allowed by the
particular negotiation protocol in use. In particular, part of
Bob’s disclosure may be to indicate that he does not have a
certain credential.
Protocols can define message elements with special
meanings. For example, a protocol might allow a party to
declare that it would like to access resource new DL, that
it does not possess a particular credential IL utility bill, or
to request the definition of a previously mentioned policy
symbol attack utility. Because it is hard to prove any prop-
erties of a protocol that permits arbitrary message elements,
we will assume that the protocol uses at most the latter two
types of special message elements. If a party requests the
definition of a policy symbol, we assume that the definition
must be provided in the next round of the negotiation (or
else the definition of the policy for that definition, or of the
policy for the policy for that definition, and so on to guaran-
tee safety). We view the initial request to access a resource
(e.g. to access new DL) as an event that precedes and trig-
gers the negotiation. The client can choose to push some
disclosures with its request for service (e.g., bribe); other-
wise, the first disclosures will be from the server, typically
including the policy for the requested service.
Looking back at the DMV example, one can see that
a need-to-know attack might not work twice on the same
client. Bob could cache the DMV policies, study them be-
fore the next time he renews his license, and then push his
driver’s license to the DMV along with his request for re-
newal. The DMV would have no excuse to ask him about
his other credentials before giving him the online renewal
token. But since the DMV has already learned what it
wanted to know about Bob, it would appreciate such a
speedup in future negotiations, so this does not represent
a weakness in the need-to-know attack.
With these definitions, we can now formally define the
attack.
Definition 4. Alice, the owner of a resource R, executes a
need-to-know attack on credential c when the following two
conditions hold:
• Whenever any client Bob successfully negotiates ac-
cess to R without any prior knowledge of the policy
protecting R, Alice learns all that she is authorized to
know about c (either Bob discloses c, Bob reveals that
he does not have c, or Alice learns that she is not au-
thorized to access c).
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• The set of credentials that Bob discloses throughout
the negotiation is not minimal. That is, we can replace
Alice’s policies by a logically equivalent set of policies
with the property that Bob can successfully negotiate
for access to R using the same set of disclosed creden-
tials excluding c, without any prior knowledge of the
policy protecting R and without disclosing any infor-
mation about c.
With a need-to-know attack, no matter how a client gains
access to R, he gives out more information than necessary
during the process—his disclosures are not minimal. It is
important to note that this definition does not simply mean
that a client can disclose more than is necessary; it means
that a client must disclose more than is necessary in order
to discover the actual contents of the policy. In the DMV
example from Section 1, for instance, a client possessing all
of the credentials passport, IL DL, and IL utility bill might
choose to disclose all three, even though only two are nec-
essary. In this case, a more privacy-conscious client with
access to the policy can calculate a minimal disclosure set.
The need-to-know attack occurs when the client is tricked
into thinking it needs to disclose an unnecessary credential
like library card. It is irrelevant to consider that a client
could discover the true policy and bypass the attack in fu-
ture negotiations—the attacker only needs one negotiation
to obtain the irrelevant credentials.
2.2 Example Model
The remainder of this section formalizes basic negotia-
tion concepts for the trust negotiation model we use, in the
style of [22]. These concepts will be needed for the proofs
in the sections that follow.
Definition 5. The disclosure of a resource R by its owner,
or the admission that its owner does not possess R, is safe
if R’s policy is satisfied by credentials present in its owner’s
KB at the time of the disclosure.
For simplicity in the definitions that follow, we do not
consider the case where one party receives a policy defini-
tion or a credential from the other party offline.
Definition 6. A negotiation is a sequence of safe disclo-
sures that is triggered by a request to access a resource R.
Further, each disclosure message must advance the state of
the negotiation.
To give a precise definition of what it means to advance
the state of the negotiation, we rely on proof trees to repre-
sent the state of the negotiation. Intuitively, each proof tree
describes a different way that a client could get access to
R. The children of a node describe one way to get access
to the resource represented by that node, e.g., one combina-
tion of credentials that will satisfy a policy. If a policy has
a) new_DL b) new_DL
IL_resident
c) new_DL
IL_resident
new_DL
IL_resident
passport
strong_ID
new_DL
IL_resident
DL
strong_ID
passport
strong_ID
Figure 2. Example proof tree evolution
not had its definition disclosed, but a policy for that policy
has been disclosed, we represent that as a dotted-line child
of the node for the policy.
Definition 7. An unpruned proof tree for the set D contain-
ing all disclosures so far in a negotiation for a resource R
can be constructed as follows:
• The root of the tree must be a node labeled R.
• If P is the name of the policy that protects credential
c, then every tree node labeled c has a child labeled P .
• If P ′ is the name of the policy that protects policy P ,
then every tree node labeled P has a single dotted-line
child labeled P ′. Unless otherwise stated, the term
child refers only to non-dotted-line children.
• If the definition of policy P appears in D, then every
node labeled P has the following children.
– If P = false, or its logical equivalent, then the
node has a single child labeled false.
– Otherwise the node has children labeled c1
through cn, where {c1, . . . , cn} is a minimal lo-
cal satisfying set for P .
For example, new DL is the root of each unpruned proof
tree for Bob’s negotiation with the DMV. Bob can only get
access to new DL (the root of each proof tree for his ne-
gotiation) by satisfying policies strong ID and IL resident,
which are the children of the root in every unpruned proof
tree for his negotiation. Below this point, the unpruned
proof trees begin to differ from one another. In some, pass-
port will be the sole child of strong ID; in others, DL will be
the only child of strong ID. In some of the trees, IL DL will
be the only child of IL resident; in other trees, IL utility bill
will be the only child. Below this level of the trees, Bob’s
own disclosures determine how the trees will grow during
the next round of the negotiation.
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Consider Figure 2. When Bob initially requests access
to the new DL service, the proof tree is initialized as shown
in Figure 2a. Assume, for this example, that the DMV then
discloses the policy for new DL (strong ID ∧ IL resident),
and also the contents of the strong ID policy (passport ∨
DL), but not the contents of the IL resident policy. Because
there are two disjuncts in the strong ID policy, this node is
replaced by two possible children, and therefore there are
two proof trees at this point as shown in Figure 2b. Assume
now that the client discloses its DL credential, removing it
from the proof trees. This results in the set of proof trees
shown in Figure 2c.
Our definition of unpruned proof tree assumes that every
resource is protected by a named policy. In the sections that
follow, we will not name every policy; the effect on the trees
is trivial.
An unpruned tree describes one potential way to gain ac-
cess to R. However, not every potential proof can succeed.
For example, Bob does not have an Illinois utility bill, so he
will never renew his license by presenting his utility bill. If
he discloses this fact, we can eliminate all proof trees that
involve a utility bill. If he discloses his passport, we can
represent this accomplishment by pruning the portion of the
tree that mentions his passport. After pruning, a proof tree
represents the remaining steps to take in one way to gain
access to R.
Definition 8. Given an unpruned proof tree T for a set D
containing all disclosures so far in a negotiation for a re-
source R, the (pruned) proof tree T ′ corresponding to T is
constructed as follows:
• Remove the tree entirely if any node is labeled c, where
D contains the disclosure that a party does not possess
c (written ¬c).
• For each credential c that is an element of D, remove
all subtrees of T rooted at nodes labeled c.
• For each policy P whose definition is present in D and
that is satisfied by disclosures in D, remove all sub-
trees rooted at nodes labeled P .
• If P ′ is the policy protecting a policy P , and P ’s def-
inition is in D, then remove every subtree rooted at a
node labeled P ′.
• If a node P has the child false, remove the subtree
rooted at the nearest ancestor of P that is a dotted-
line child. If there is no such ancestor, then remove the
entire proof tree.
If there are no (pruned) proof trees at all, then the client
cannot possibly gain access to the desired resource. If there
is an empty (pruned) proof tree, then the client has just
gained access to the desired resource.
To advance the state of the negotiation, a party must dis-
close information that changes the set of proof trees and also
makes it possible for the other party to advance the state
of the negotiation. For example, it is not sufficient for the
DMV just to disclose the definition of policy for new DL,
as Bob cannot change the resulting set of proof trees: he
does not know the definition of IL resident or strong ID.
The DMV must also disclose the definition of at least one
of these two policies.
Definition 9. A disclosure message D evolves the proof
trees if the set of proof trees immediately before D is dis-
closed is different from the set immediately after D is dis-
closed.
Definition 10. A set of proof trees is evolvable for a party
Alice if at least one proof tree contains a leaf labeled l,
which we call an evolvable leaf, that satisfies one of the
following two properties:
• l is a credential possibly belonging to Alice.
• l is a policy of Alice’s, and she has not yet disclosed its
definition.
Definition 11. A proof tree is partially evolved if it contains
an evolvable leaf for at least one party. A fully evolved tree
has no evolvable leaves for either party.
Definition 12. A disclosure D advances the negotiation if
one of the following three conditions is met:
• D evolves the proof trees and the resulting set of proof
trees is evolvable for the other party.
• D requests the definition of a policy symbol that ap-
pears in a previous disclosure message and whose def-
inition has not yet been disclosed.
• D includes the definition of a policy symbol whose
definition was requested in the immediately preced-
ing disclosure message, or the definition of the pol-
icy protecting that policy, and so on (whether or not
that definition has already been disclosed). This pol-
icy definition must contain at least one non-policy sym-
bol, to prevent unuseful disclosures like “Policy1 =
Policy2 ∧ Policy3.”
By contrast, we say that D is unmotivated if it does not ad-
vance the negotiation.
Here we skip over a fine point: Alice could request the
definition of a policy symbol P , be given the definition of
policy for P in the next message, and then immediately re-
quest the definition of P again in the next message. We
assume that protocol includes provisions to prevent such
loops, e.g., by requiring that Alice not ask again until some
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other state change has occurred. The details of those provi-
sions do not matter for our purposes.
We make the following assumptions about the negotia-
tion process:
1. Policies cannot be changed in the middle of a negoti-
ation. This can be guaranteed by a cryptographic sig-
nature over the policies, exchanged at the beginning of
the negotiation.4
2. Disclosures are always safe.
3. Disclosures must advance the negotiation in a way that
is publicly verifiable. This assumption prevents attack-
ers from making useless disclosures that will force ar-
bitrary clients, who will typically not have information
that is either secret or exchanged offline, to guess at
how to satisfy the resource’s policy.
4. A negotiation ends immediately if one party does not
disclose anything that will advance the negotiation.
5. A negotiation ends immediately and access to the tar-
get resource is granted if the policy protecting the tar-
get resource has been visibly satisfied, meaning the
other party knows the policy and can prove that enough
credentials have been disclosed to satisfy it. Without
this assumption, an attacker could drag on a negotia-
tion long after the client has shown that it is eligible to
access its desired resource.5
3 The Attacks
We now describe how to execute the actual need-to-know
attacks, given an arbitrary set of policies and credentials.
We use the following conventions:
4There may be legitimate reasons why a policy may change based on
information discovered during a negotiation; however, if we allow changes
to take place, then a need-to-know attack is quite simple. For every dis-
closure, rewrite it to contain a disjunct with a single protected policy. On
the next turn, this protected policy can be rewritten to request any arbitrary
credential not yet received. Our work shows that a need-to-know attack
still exists under more strict conditions.
5It could legitimately be argued that when a policy is satisfied, the re-
source must be disclosed, regardless of whether it is visibly satisfied. In-
deed, one of our proposed solutions to this problem discusses how to en-
force such a rule without violating the privacy of either party. However,
if we apply to all resources in general (including credentials), an agent is
likely to satisfy a lot of policies during the course of the negotiation, Such
a rule would impinge on the other agent’s autonomy in determining what
to disclose, effectually resulting in a need-to-know attack in the other di-
rection: a client could send all of its credentials and then wait to receive a
list of resources for which it has satisfied the policies.
Alice The attacker (the DMV in the earlier
example)
Bob Alice’s victim
R Alice’s resource that Bob wants to access
α Name of the policy originally protecting
R (original policy in the DMV example)
α′ Name of the actual policy protecting R,
rewritten for attack
ai A credential that Alice may own
b1, . . . , bn Credentials Bob may own that Alice
would like to learn about
bn+1, . . . , bm Credentials Bob may own that do not
interest Alice, m ≥ n
φi Equivalent of the attacki policies in the
DMV example
Qi Policies Alice usees to prevent Bob from
having more than one possible disclosure.
Not needed in the DMV example.
In the following section we show how to attack a party
whose policies are freely disclosable (i.e., the policy that
protects their policies is true), in the case where the nego-
tiation protocol does not allow one to request the definition
of an undefined policy symbol. While this is perhaps an un-
realistic scenario, it is the simplest case to understand. We
relax these assumptions in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 Freely Disclosable Policies, No Re-
quests for Policy Definitions
The attacker, Alice, has a resource R protected by a
policy α. Alice is also interested in obtaining credentials
b1, . . . , bn that are not mentioned in α. All the other cre-
dentials Bob could possibly own are bn+1, . . . , bm; these
may occur in α or may be uninteresting credentials from
Alice’s perspective.
Alice prepares for the attack by rewriting her policy to
be α′ = α ∨ φ1 ∨ ν, where φ1 comes from the following
definition of φi:
• φi = (Pi ∧ bi) ∨ φi+1 for i < n
• φn = (Pn ∧ bn)
• each Pi = α
and ν is defined as follows:
• ν =
∨m
i=1(Q0 ∧Qi)
• Q0 = α
• Qi = bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Notice that ν also covers Bob’s other credentials that Alice
doesn’t necessarily want. Figure 3 shows an example where
Alice wants credentials b1, b2, and b3, and Bob could pos-
sibly also have credential b4. The policies for φ2 and φ3
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(P1 ∧ b1) ∨ ((P2 ∧ b2) ∨ ((P3 ∧ b3)))φ1:
φ2
φ3
ν: (Q0 ∧Q1) ∨ (Q0 ∧Q2) ∨ (Q0 ∧Q3) ∨ (Q0 ∧Q4)
R← α ∨ φ1 ∨ ν
Figure 3. Example attack against freely dis-
closable policies
are shown expanded in this figure; of course, Alice will not
immediately reveal the contents of these named policies.
Lemma 1. The rewritten policy α′ is logically equivalent
to α. Thus, rewriting the policy will not allow unauthorized
access, nor will it disallow authorized access.
Proof. Straightforward case analysis.
Alice also needs to rewrite the policies for each of her
credentials in such a way that only one credential at a time
is requested. She can do this by replacing each credential in
the policy with a unique named policy containing that cre-
dential, and revealing the contents of each named policy one
at a time (a step to which we will refer later). For instance,
if the policy for a1 is b1 ∧ (b2 ∨ b3), Alice rewrites it to the
following (for some unused symbols Π1, Π2, and Π3):
policy for a1 = Π1 ∧ (Π2 ∨Π3)
Π1 = b1
Π2 = b2
Π3 = b3
Alice commits to the rewritten policies, rather than the orig-
inal policies, and can compute a cryptographic commitment
on them if requested. We are now ready to define Alice’s
strategy.
Alice’s strategy: When Bob asks for access to R, Alice
discloses her rewritten policy, as well as the contents of φ1
and ν. Thereafter, on each of her turns to make a disclosure,
she uses the following strategy:
1. If Bob has one or more evolvable leaves in the current
proof tree, reveal the definition of a policy Qi = bi,
where Alice already knows all that she is authorized to
know about bi, or where the policy for bi is satisfied.
Since such a disclosure technically evolves the proof
tree, but practically gives Bob nothing new to work
with, we will hereafter call these Qj policies stalling
policies.
2. Otherwise, perform the first of these disclosures which
is possible:
• Disclose a minimum satisfying set for one of
Bob’s credentials.
• Reveal pieces of relevant policies for one of Al-
ice’s resources (not including the Qj’s and φj ’s)
until Bob has an evolvable leaf.
• Reveal as many of the φj policies as needed to
give Bob an evolvable leaf.
3. When Alice can make no more such disclosures, she
has finished her need-to-know attack. She can disclose
the definition of α and carry out an ordinary trust ne-
gotiation with Bob.
3.2 Freely Disclosable Policies, Requests
for Policy Definitions
We now modify the protocol to allow Bob to request
that Alice disclose the definition of a policy symbol that
has been mentioned but not yet defined. We require Alice
to answer this request immediately by either revealing the
contents, or showing the access policy for the named policy
(or for its policy, and so on).
Unfortunately, Alice can still execute the attack by
adding unsatisfiable policies to protect the policies that were
created as described in Section 3.1. She cannot use the un-
satisfiable policies to protect them directly, because they
would prevent her from ever revealing (for example) α or
any of the stalling policies to anyone. Instead, we take an
approach shown in Figure 4. Each named policy (including
those protecting Alice’s credentials, which are not shown)
is protected by another named policy τi. Each τi contains
the policy true, but is in turn protected by the policy false.
In other words, Alice is free to disclose each original pol-
icy, but she is not free to disclose the fact that she is free to
disclose them. Because each τi is a different named policy,
revealing one of the protected named policies yields no new
information about any of the other τi policies, and thus Bob
gets no benefit from this new protocol.
3.3 Protected Policies
A natural question that follows from these attack exam-
ples is whether the attack arises due to the mismatch in ex-
pressiveness between the attacker’s protected policies and
the victim’s unprotected policies, or whether it is more fun-
damental to trust negotiation. Consider the policies under
ν. Disclosing each subpolicy Qi effectively allows the at-
tacker to stall the negotiation, since although by strict defi-
nition they do advance the negotiation, they do not request
anything new or allow the victim any new evolvable leaves.
Nothing precludes either party from duplicating these
stalling policies, and there is no limit to how many policies
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φ1:
α
α
P2 ∧ b2 P3 ∧ b3
α
τ1 τ2 τ4
τ3 τ5
(P1 ∧ b1) ∨ φ2 ∨ φ3
ν: (Q0 ∧ Q1) ∨ (Q0 ∧ Q2) ∨ (Q0 ∧ Q3) ∨ (Q0 ∧ Q4)
α
τ7τ6 τ8
b1 b2 b3
τ9
b4
τ10
R← α ∨ φ1 ∨ ν
τ0 = true
false
Figure 4. Example attack under the modified
protocol
they may have, other than the physical memory of the ma-
chine and the bandwidth of the connection. Thus, against
a victim with protected policies, a well-prepared attacker
can add enough stalling policies to force the victim to ex-
haust all evolvable leaves until he is forced to start disclos-
ing his policies, and the attacker can proceed as described
in Section 3.2. In the worst case, against a victim who also
has stalling policies, it becomes an arms race where the
party with the most stalling policies can eventually attack
the other party.
4 Proofs
In this section, we prove that Alice’s strategy does in-
deed yield a need-to-know attack on all of the credentials
b1, . . . , bn. For brevity, we refer to pruned proof trees as
simply “proof trees” unless otherwise indicated.
Observe that during a negotiation, a party may evolve
a leaf by disclosing its policy. However, not all of the re-
sources mentioned in that policy may appear as leaves in
the resulting proof tree. Indeed, some of the resources men-
tioned in the policy may have been mentioned before, and
appear with a subtree below them. Some of these subtrees
may have been irrelevant and are now once again relevant.
For instance, consider Figure 5a. This represents a section
of a possible proof tree where the policy for b1 is a1∨a2, the
policy for a1 is b2, the policy for b2 is a2, and a2 is freely
disclosable. If Alice discloses a2, she satisfies both the pol-
icy for b2 and the policy for b1. If Bob chooses to disclose
b1, then the subtree rooted at a1 is no longer relevant. If,
however, Bob introduces another credential b3 with a pol-
(a) (b)
b2
b1
a1
b1
a2
b2
a2
b3
a1
Figure 5. (a) Example proof tree sections
leading to reinstated nodes, (b) Exam-
ple proof tree section containing reinstated
nodes
icy a1, a1 is not an evolvable leaf for Alice because she has
already disclosed its policy, but is still waiting to receive b2.
Definition 13. A reinstated node in a proof tree is one that
appears due to one of its ancestors being mentioned in the
previous disclosure.
For instance, both a1 and b2 in Figure 5b are reinstated
nodes, since a1 was mentioned in a previous disclosure.
Lemma 2. During the need-to-know portion of Alice’s
strategy, any evolvable leaf owned by Bob that is reinstated
by some policy disclosure must itself have a visibly satisfied
policy.
For instance, this lemma guarantees that the policies pro-
tecting credentials such as b2 in Figure 5b have already been
satisfied. We will use this lemma in the following main
theorem, and prove it later, being careful to avoid circular
logic.
Theorem 1. After each of Alice’s disclosures (described in
steps 1 and 2 of the strategy), Bob either has a single evolv-
able leaf representing a credential whose policy is not yet
satisfied, or he has several evolvable leaves representing
credentials whose policies are each satisfied.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of disclo-
sures. After Alice’s first disclosure, Bob’s only evolvable
leaf is b1, so the claim holds in the base case.
Now suppose Bob makes a disclosure, after which he
still has an evolvable leaf. Then there are two cases:
• The leaf was already evolvable before he made the dis-
closure. Then by the inductive hypothesis, all of his
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evolvable leaves from the beginning of his disclosure
had satisfied policies.
• The leaf was reinstated when Bob revealed a policy.
By Lemma 2, this leaf’s policy is satisfied.
In either case, if there are evolvable leaves for Bob when
Alice’s turn to make a disclosure starts, then they all have
satisfied policies. Now, if Alice performs a stalling disclo-
sure Qj = bj , there are several possibilities for her choice
of bj:
• bj has been disclosed (or Bob does not have it). In this
case, bj will be pruned from the resulting proof tree
(or the entire tree mentioning bj will be deleted in the
pruning process). No new evolvable leaves are added.
• bj has a satisfied policy. But then bj must be one of the
existing leaves, not a new one.
In both cases, the invariant is preserved. It suffices to show
that Alice has a valid Qj = bj stalling disclosure available
to her. But note that each time she must make a stalling dis-
closure, Bob’s evolvable leaves all have satisfied policies.
Each time a policy for one of Bob’s credentials bj becomes
satisfied, Qj becomes a valid stalling disclosure for Alice,
and remains valid until Alice uses it. Thus there are at least
as many unused Qj policies as there are satisfied leaves, so
there will always be a valid choice of Qj for Alice in this
step.
Now we consider the case where Bob has no remaining
evolvable leaves after his turn to make a disclosure. We
consider one of the three possible kinds of disclosures that
Alice’s strategy prescribes:
• She may disclose a minimum satisfying set for one of
Bob’s resources. If one of Bob’s resources becomes a
leaf in this step, it must be because Alice’s disclosure
satisfied its policy, so the invariant holds.
• If she discloses one of her own policies, adding a node
to the tree representing a credential bj (owned by Bob),
two things can happen: If bj was never mentioned be-
fore, then it is the only leaf added to the pruned proof
trees. Otherwise, there is a tree of reinstated nodes
below bj . By Lemma 2, all the reinstated leaves (if
any) must have satisfied policies. (Also, disclosing a
policy might yield no evolvable leaves for Bob, if for
instance it mentions a credential that Bob has already
disclosed. In this case, Alice reveals as many policies
as necessary until Bob has an evolvable leaf.)
• Disclosing the contents of one of the φi policies that
has not yet been disclosed adds at most one evolvable
leaf for Bob.
Another important observation for this type of disclo-
sure is the following: Suppose the first two types of
disclosures are not possible. One possibility is that
each proof tree containing another φi has been re-
moved entirely in the pruning process (by becoming
unsatisfiable), or its φi has been pruned away (by bi
being disclosed). Otherwise, the contents all of the
policies in the pruned proof trees (apart from the φi’s
and Qi’s) are fully disclosed, and Alice cannot dis-
close a minimum satisfying set for any of Bob’s cre-
dentials. If her credentials cannot satisfy any policy in
any tree, then she can never make progress on any of
these trees and can conclude that she will never satisfy
any of Bob’s policies mentioned within those trees.
In all cases, the invariant holds.
Corollary 1. For any agent with freely disclosable policies,
Alice’s strategy is a need-to-know attack on b1, . . . , bn.
Proof. The need-to-know portion of Alice’s strategy fin-
ishes when all φi policies are exhausted. As observed
above, she only moves on to the next φi when the she learns
she can never obtain any of the credentials in any proof trees
that contain φi, or when each of these trees are sufficiently
pruned. If all possible proof trees containing φi have been
pruned, then either bi was disclosed, Bob does not have bi,
or Alice can never satisfy the policies needed to obtain bi.
In each case, Alice learns all that she is authorized to learn
about bi.
Furthermore, after the need-to-know portion of the strat-
egy, the “true policy” α is revealed and the standard negoti-
ation follows, from which Bob can gain access to R.
It now suffices to prove Lemma 2.
Proof (of Lemma 2). To avoid circular logic, we will con-
sider the first time where the statement of the lemma is vi-
olated, and show a contradiction. Up until this point in the
negotiation, the statement of the lemma held, and so the in-
variant given in Theorem 1 has also held.
Consider any leaf bi which was reinstated by some pol-
icy disclosure, and whose policy is not satisfied. Since it
appears as a leaf, Bob must not yet have disclosed the pol-
icy for bi (otherwise its policy has been completely pruned,
and therefore satisfied). As it was reinstated, it must have
been mentioned (and relevant) at some previous time dur-
ing the negotiation. Since its policy has never been given,
it must have appeared as a leaf at that time. But by the in-
variant of Theorem 1, this leaf with an unsatisfied policy
must have been Bob’s only evolvable leaf! His only possi-
ble disclosures could have been to disclose bi, admit that he
did not have bi, disclose its policy, or abort the negotiation.
Since Bob did not disclose its policy, and the negotiation is
continuing, he did not take the latter two choices. But the
former two choices would have pruned bi from all future
proof trees, a contradiction.
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By this contradiction, the condition of the lemma must
always hold.
Theorem 2. If Bob can request policy definitions, the need-
to-know attack still either limits Bob to one evolvable leaf
after each disclosure, or multiple evolvable leaves repre-
senting credentials for which the policies have been satis-
fied.
Proof. (Sketch) Any time Bob requests the definition of a
policy, Alice can reveal the policy protecting that policy.
If Bob requests the definition of one of the Pi, Qi, or φi
policies, Alice will send one of the τi policies. Each τi is
protected by a policy that cannot be satisfied, so these will
never be revealed. Thus the only part of these policies that
could give Bob a new evolvable leaf is bi. Thus Alice can
still follow the same strategy as in Theorem 1.
What if Alice attacks Bob, and Bob immediately turns
around and attacks Alice? Both parties can stall the nego-
tiation for quite a while, by greeting each request for a cre-
dential by a need-to-know attack. However, recall that both
parties committed to their policies at the beginning of the
negotiation. Since each party can have only finitely many
policies protecting his policies and credentials, after a fi-
nite number of messages, one party (say, Alice) will not be
able to stall any longer. From that point onward, Bob will
control the negotiation, giving Alice only one evolvable leaf
after each of his disclosures. However, once he finishes his
attack, Alice can continue with hers, giving Bob only one
evolvable leaf until the negotiation ends.
5 Attacking Other Protocols
The concept of protecting sensitive policies with other
policies is described and formally analyzed for interoper-
ability properties with other parties in [21]. Analysis of this
added expressiveness led to the formulation of the need-to-
know attack. It is important to understand, however, that
such an attack is not simply a weakness of the particular
model we chose, but rather a problem with trust negotiation
in general. We show how a need-to-know attack can be car-
ried out in two other models. In both examples, we demon-
strate a simple attack in which only one unneeded credential
is requested. While not as well generalized and formalized
as the attacks described in Section 3, it demonstrates the
existence of the attack with an easy-to-understand example.
In both cases, we are also able to omit the stalling poli-
cies. Conceptually, these are only necessary when there are
clearly other ways for the attacker to advance the negotia-
tion (the protected policies) and neither model requires the
attacker to state the existence of protected policies.
The first model, proposed in [6], allows access policies to
be sensitive; however, unlike [21], it requires the negotiat-
ing party to be authorized to see the contents of a protection
policy before the protected resource can be revealed. The
first part of a policy lists attributes that the client must sat-
isfy, and the second part lists conditions that the server will
evaluate on the attributes before granting access. Because
these conditions may be complicated, the server is not re-
quired to specify exactly how to evaluate these conditions.
We can formulate a similar attack in this model as follows,
using the same scenario as in Section 1, where Alice at-
tempts to contact a service called new DL hosted by DMV.
The actual policy for new DL is (strong ID ∧ IL resident).
DMV wishes to see Alice’s library card credential, if she
has one. DMV can write its policies as shown in Figure 6.
Because the second prerequisite policy contains nothing
that a client Bob can disclose, Bob must disclose his li-
brary card if he owns one. If he doesn’t own one, the server
can disclose the resource’s policy anyway since the second
prerequisite policy is satisfied. Thus, even though the li-
brary card credential is not logically required, there is no
way a client can access the service without disclosing this
credential (provided the server can satisfy its policy). This
constitutes a need-to-know attack on the library card cre-
dential. The second service prereqs policy may seem a lit-
tle far-fetched, but consider a policy like “allow open access
during normal business hours,” which doesn’t depend on
any client credentials, just some internal server condition.
Such a policy would be indistinguishable from this policy,
from the client’s point of view. It would not be desirable to
disallow policies containing an empty credential list simply
to prevent a need-to-know attack from occurring, as such a
benefit would come at the expense of expressibility of some
legitimate policies.
A similar model was proposed in [19]. This paper de-
scribes a trust negotiation model that allows “Ack policies”
that must first be satisfied before the actual policy for a cre-
dential can be disclosed, even if the client does not pos-
sess the credential. A similar attack can be defined for this
model, as shown in Figure 7. The paper also describes a
protocol for exchanging policies and credentials by defin-
ing a structure called a Trust-Target Graph, and rules for
which each party can add edges to the graph. When Al-
ice requests access to the new DL service, DMV is allowed
to advance the protocol by adding the control edge 〈DMV
: DMV.new DL
?
և Alice〉 ֋ 〈Alice : ?X.library card
?
և
DMV〉. Similar to the previous example, Alice has no
choice but to disclose her policy for her library card, if she
has one.
Other frameworks for trust negotiation, such as [3, 4, 5,
11], do not support sensitive policies; however many po-
tential applications of trust negotiation do include the need
to protect sensitive policies. We conjecture that adding a
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service prereqs(new DL()) ← credential(library card(user=U, ...)).
service prereqs(new DL()) ← (empty) | unknown predicate().
service reqs(new DL()) ← strong ID(U), IL resident(U).
strong ID and IL resident defined as needed
unknown predicate() ← true.
Figure 6. Example attack using model from [6].
ACDMV[new DL] = DMV.strong ID, DMV.IL resident.
AckDMV[new DL] = (Library.library card) ∨
(DMV.strong ID, DMV.IL resident).
Figure 7. Example attack using model from [19].
layer of policy protection to these systems without care-
fully considering possible countermeasures would similarly
introduce vulnerability to this type of attack.
The attacks described in this paper apply to protocols
in which credentials are actually disclosed to each other.
This opens the question of whether other protocols and
models that do not directly disclose credentials, such as
idemix [8], OSBE [17], OACerts [15], and hidden creden-
tials [12], might also be vulnerable to such an attack. A
variation of the need-to-know attack could be carried out
through repeated negotiations, by augmenting the true pol-
icy with extra unneeded requirements. This attack is consid-
erably weaker, as it does not maintain logical equivalence to
the original policy, and requires the victim to cooperate by
restarting the negotiation. However, such an attack would
still be indistinguishable from legitimate policy changes. It
is not known whether a full need-to-know attack could be
performed on these models.
A proposed protocol for exchanging protected creden-
tials cryptographically is described in [1]. Each party re-
ceives the other party’s credential if and only if each policy
is satisfied; otherwise, neither party gains any knowledge
about the other, including what the policy was. While such
a protocol would seemingly eliminate the need for sensi-
tive policies, their model assumes the existence of single
credentials containing all relevant attributes, issued from a
central authority. This would not be appropriate for open
systems. The weaker variation of the attack using repeated
negotiations could also be applied to this protocol.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have formalized the need-to-know at-
tack and proven its effectiveness. The need-to-know attack
relies on an attacker Alice’s ability to hide portions of her
policy and limit the possible responses of her victim Bob
during trust negotiation, thereby harvesting information ir-
relevant to the negotiation. Alice can rewrite her policies
so that Bob repeatedly finds himself with only two options:
send Alice information about a credential c that she would
like to harvest, or end the negotiation. Our study suggests
that protocol designers for trust negotiation protocols may
need to consider this type of vulnerability when allowing
protected policies.
There are several potential countermeasures to mitigate
the need-to-know attack, which we sketch below:
• The most important is to allow parties to ask for the
definitions of policy names that have been mentioned
during the negotiation, but not yet defined. As we have
already shown, this does not prevent or stop a need-to-
know attack, but it is a useful component of a larger
set of countermeasures that build upon this capabil-
ity. A second useful step is to have parties commit
to their policy definitions at the start of a negotiation.
Similarly, our proofs are effective even with this coun-
termeasure, but at least it can prevent on-the-fly at-
tacks against selected clients (e.g., ones with certain
zip codes) and has other advantages, discussed below.
• Enforce fairness in the protocol. One way to do this
is to require each party to automatically push the ap-
propriate policy definition as soon as a policy name
is mentioned. Similarly, one could give highest prior-
ity to requests for policy definitions (i.e., a requested
policy definition must be sent unless the policy pro-
tecting it is not satisfied). However, this makes it easy
for denial-of-service attackers to request many policy
definitions. As discussed earlier, it can also be highly
inefficient when most clients can only gain access to
a resource through one particular combination of cre-
dentials.
It is also a difficult problem to enforce that play-
ers follow a non-cheating strategy, when cheating is
undetectable. One solution is to incorporate zero-
knowledge proofs [10]. In conjunction with provid-
ing commitments of policies up-front (to thwart policy
rewriting), Bob could request that Alice prove to him
(in zero-knowledge) that she is withholding a certain
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named policy because Bob has not yet satisfied it (and
not because she is “cheating”). In the case of our need-
to-know attack, this would affect the τi policies, which
are true but are never revealed as being true. How-
ever, if the parties are willing to accept the computa-
tional overhead of zero-knowledge proofs, other proto-
cols with similar efficiency drawbacks (discussed be-
low) might be more appealing.
• A solution involving societal pressure is for an audit-
ing agency to examine the policies of a resource owner
to look for evidences of inappropriate information-
harvesting practices. If no such evidence is found, the
agency can sign a certificate that includes a commit-
ment of the policy contents. A client can look for such
a certificate before starting a negotiation with an un-
familiar resource owner, check that the certificate was
issued by an auditor that it trusts, check that the com-
mitment in the certificate matches the commitment that
the owner sent at the beginning of the negotiation, and
have the resource owner prove that it is the entity men-
tioned in the certificate.
Even without policy certification, a party might rec-
ognize that it is under attack. For example, suppose
that Bob does not have a utility bill, patient ID, or li-
brary card when he renews his license. He will disclose
no new credentials between the time he first asks for
the definition of original policy and when he receives
it, which suggests that the policy for original policy
was already satisfied when he requested that defini-
tion. However, in practice policies may contain ref-
erences to external conditions, such as the time of day.
Since Bob (more precisely, his agent) never sees the
definition of original policy, or the definitions of the
other protected policies that were equivalent to origi-
nal policy, it will be hard for his agent to argue that it
was already satisfied. He could report his suspicions to
an auditor, though. He could also pool his experiences
with those of other clients, to form a clearer view of
Alice’s policies and behavior. Similarly, if a human in-
spects the list of credentials that a particular resource
owner requested from his agent, the human will know
whether the requests were really appropriate for the re-
source being accessed. For example, Bob-the-human
will know that the DMV should not request his patient
ID, and report it to an auditor.
• Restrict policy definitions to at most two layers. More
precisely, consider the set of resources that Alice pos-
sesses and that are not policies. Alice can define poli-
cies that protect those resources (layer 1) and poli-
cies that protect those policies (layer 2), but we no
longer allow Alice to define policies that protect layer-
2-policies. That prevents the DMV from using the
policies defined in Section 3.2. We conjecture that it
also suffices to prevent all need-to-know attacks using
this protocol.
• Require that a policy not be stronger than the policy it
protects. That is, anyone that can satisfy a policy can
also satisfy the policy that protects it. This is an ap-
proach discussed in [13] and would certainly prevent
the usage of the false policies that we used in Sec-
tion 3.2. This solution would, however, come at the
expense of autonomy in defining legitimate policies for
VIP treatment or unadvertised specials—for instance,
one might allow Sam’s Club employees to view the
policy for the special offer for university employees
described in Section 1, even if they themselves are not
university employees.
• Have resource owners explicitly delimit the scope of
the credentials that they are willing to disclose in or-
der to gain access to a particular resource—a “need-to-
know policy” for that resource. For example, Bob can
predefine a need-to-know policy for license renewal:
he will present no credentials other than his current li-
cense. When checking out an audiobook, he will only
present his library card. However, this approach has
drawbacks in practice. It takes time and effort to write
and debug a policy; most credential owners would not
be willing to expend that energy. While a helpful
third party, such as an auditing firm, could issue stan-
dard packages of suggested need-to-know policies for
widely accessed online services (such as all DMVs in
the US and Canada), these policies will only cover a
fraction of the total number of services available on-
line. For example, it is unrealistic to expect such a
package to explicitly list all the libraries offering au-
diobooks in North America. While the auditor could
offer a suggested need-to-know policy for libraries in
general, Bob would either have to manually identify a
particular site as a library, which would be too much
work for him; rely on the site to self-categorize itself
correctly, which is unreliable; or rely on a third-party
categorization service, which would be hard-pressed to
keep up with the fast-changing world of internet ser-
vice offerings. Thus we prefer to avoid explicit en-
codings of need-to-know policies, if other countermea-
sures suffice.
• Use an initial negotiation in which an agent does not
disclose anything, allowing him to discover as much
about the other agent’s policies as possible. While
this countermeasure would certainly work against the
strategies described in this paper, it would not be diffi-
cult to imagine an attacker Alice “calling the bluff” of
a victim Bob by surmising that Bob may be intention-
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ally hiding his credentials, and in turn refusing to dis-
close any of her policies in the hopes that Bob would
relax his policies and repeat the negotiation later. Ad-
ditionally, this may be construed as an attempt to cause
a denial-of-service attack.
• Use a negotiation method that does not directly dis-
close credentials, such as the kinds of techniques sug-
gested in work on idemix [8], OSBE [17], OACerts
[15], hidden credentials [12], and other cryptographic
approaches to trust negotiation [7, 9]. These tech-
niques can be integrated into a system that also sup-
ports direct disclosure of credentials [16]. For very
sensitive information, these techniques can be well
worth the extra runtime costs of employing them.
The measures described above will not prevent Alice
from harvesting information from “stupid” clients. For ex-
ample, Bob might not request any policy definitions from
Alice, even though he is allowed to. From a theoretical
viewpoint, it is tempting to think that such clients deserve
what they may get. However, in practice, there may be good
reasons to build clients with sharply limited reasoning abil-
ities. For example, to save power Bob might not analyze
policies at all, but instead send all information that he can
about every credential mentioned so far in the negotiation.
To harvest information about credential c from Bob, Alice
can just rewrite her policy α to α ∨ (α ∧ c) without hid-
ing anything. To prevent such attacks, policy auditors could
issue special certificates to resource owners whose policies
meet the special needs of “stupid” clients.
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